I. Introduction
The business practices of medical device manufacturers have come under increasing scrutiny over the last several years following a spate of product recalls that precipitated hundreds of class action product liability lawsuits starting around 2004. 1 When compared with stories of prematurely failing defibrillator batteries *188 and unwanted surgical explants of pacemakers containing faulty seals, the modest headline in the November 17, 2007 Business Section of The New York Times announcing the eleventh-hour settlement of a lawsuit between Boston Scientific (formerly the Guidant Corporation 2 ) and the Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI) promised nothing in the way of drama. 3 Behind the ho-hum headline, however, is an important legal story about the quietly expanding scope of trade secrecy and the ways in which that expansion might contribute to the unsustainably rising cost of health care.
As Richard Epstein has noted, trade secrets have taken a back seat to copyrights and patents in the explosion of scholarship on intellectual property issues in recent years. 4 While scholars concerned for the future of the public domain have argued forcefully and persuasively against the continuing expansion of rights--both in scope and duration--for holders of copyrights and patents, they have said little about the corresponding "creep" that has been occurring in the law of trade secrets. 5 The Guidant-ECRI litigation is a prime example of both how this creep is occurring and how it may succeed, if not through the creation of legal precedent, then through the creation of a litigation-induced chilling effect on the sharing of information that is alleged, though never proven, to be a trade secret. Because the case settled before a decision on the merits of Guidant's novel claim that the prices paid for its cardiac rhythm management (CRM) devices are trade secrets, the legality of sharing device prices remains indeterminate, and the practice of sharing them is therefore fraught with risk for Guidant's hospital customers and the consultants who advise them.
III. From the Common Law to the UTSA: Ephemeral Information and the Expanding Embrace of Trade Secrecy
The notion that trade secrets are a kind of property has been controversial among intellectual property scholars, who have rightly argued that property rights in information are both more problematic to define and more difficult to enforce *194 than property rights in tangible things. 30 It has also been pointed out that the "relational focus of trade secret's liability rules aligns trade secret law more closely with the law of contract than with the law of property." 31 The characterization of trade secrets as property, however, has a pedigree in the U.S. common law that reaches all the way back to the earliest-decided cases, among the first of which was Peabody v. Norfolk. 32 In Peabody, the executors of a Massachusetts mill owner's estate successfully sued the mill's former engineer for breaching a contract in which the engineer had agreed to use "all the means in his power" to prevent others from obtaining information relating to a secret process for manufacturing gunny cloth from jute butts. 33 As a matter of contract law, the court concluded that the engineer was "bound . . . never to disclose the secret confidentially imparted to him during the term of his actual service." 34 The court also grounded its decision in property law, invoking the rule from the English case of Morison v. Moat 35 to hold that "[one] who invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether proper for a patent or not, . . . has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons." 36 With Peabody, the English common law of trade secrets made its transatlantic crossing as an equitable rule governing the conduct of employees with respect to secret manufacturing processes developed by their employers and recognized by courts as a type of property. The rule from Morison, by way of Peabody, was subsequently adopted in many states in a range of cases from around the turn of the twentieth century involving secret manufacturing processes, designs, patterns, and formulas. 37 Also influential in the early U.S. common law cases was Justice *195 Story's Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (1835), according to which equity protects secrets communicated during the course of employment. 38 Justice Story divided such secrets into three categories: "secrets of trade or secrets of title, or any other secrets of the party important to [the employer's] interests." 39 Although neither the Commentaries nor the early reported decisions provide any specific definition for "secret of trade," the great majority of the cases involved claims for secret manufacturing processes. 40 In a minority of cases, protection was sought and granted for other types of secret business information, including books containing information about farmers' insurance policies; 41 a "secret code" for determining the sale price of goods sold from catalogs by traveling salesmen; 42 compilations of *196 price quotations for stocks and commodities; 43 and names, addresses, and requirements of customers on a sales route. 44 By the 1920s, courts in several states had adopted the definition of trade secret from William Mack's Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (1906) 45 : A trade secret is a plan or process, tool, mechanism, or compound, known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. It is a property right which equity, in the exercise of its power to prevent a breach of trust, will protect. It differs from a patent in that as soon as the secret is discovered, either by an examination of the product or in any other honest way, the discoverer has the full right to use it. A process commonly known to the trade is not a trade secret and will not be protected by injunction. 46 Among the courts adopting the Cyclopedia's definition was the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, which declined, in the seminal case of Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, to extend trade secret protection to a list of customers on a sales route. 47 Denying the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiff--the defendant's former employer--the court held that a list of customers, which the defendant reproduced from memory, was not the type of information that qualified as a trade secret. 48 As far as the court was concerned, the limited scope of the Cyclopedia definition was "sufficiently broad to cover and protect all applied methods, formulas, and processes in which a proprietary interest may be acquired in connection with the manufacturing, and even marketing, the product handled and disposed of by the employer." 49 The court saw no justification for protecting as property information *197 "which is common and is essential and necessary to the prosecution of any business" and which was not "the product of any kind of special ingenuity." 50 As in some of the early cases involving customer lists, claims of trade secret protection for information not readily classifiable as a method, formula, or process and not the product of any "special ingenuity" were regarded with skepticism by courts, which sought to distinguish trade secrets from ordinary, albeit private, business information. In a case from 1910, for example, a corporate litigant attempted unsuccessfully to resist a subpoena for its books and records on grounds that they were protected as trade secrets. 51 The court held that [t]he term 'trade secret' as it is usually understood means a secret formula or process, not patented, known only to certain individuals who use it in compounding or manufacturing some article of trade having a commercial value. It is rarely, if ever, used to denote the mere privacy with which an ordinary commercial business is carried on. 52 The impulse to limit the scope of trade secrecy by denying protection for ordinary, private commercial information is memorialized in the First Restatement of Torts, in which the treatment of trade secrets is separated from that of non-trade secret confidential business information. 53 Trade secrets are discussed in § 757; 54 confidential business information is discussed in § 759. 55 Notwithstanding the caveat that "[a]n exact definition of trade secret is not possible," 56 § 757 of the First Restatement defines a trade secret in a fairly circumscribed way as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do *198 not know or use it." 57 In addition to this affirmative definition and a list of factors to be weighed by courts in determining whether information qualifies for trade secret protection, 58 § 757 provides a negative definition of trade secret, differentiating trade secret information from other types of confidential business information:
[A trade secret] differs from other secret information in a business . . . in that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business, as, for example the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the like. A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. 59 Although the complementary attributes of non-ephemerality and continuous use are not explicitly prescribed in the early common law decisions, they inhere in the quite narrow (i.e., formula-method-or-process) definitions of trade secrecy that had been adopted by courts across the country at the time the First Restatement was published. A trade secret within the meaning of these definitions is not just any kind of information that a business values and treats confidentially; it must be durable information on which the business runs. This requirement has sometimes been overlooked by courts and commentators, 60 but it represents a very important check on the self-serving tendency of business entities to hoard valuable information. The indulgence of this tendency could substantially inhibit socially desirable, fair competition. Insisting upon a distinction between trade secret information and private-but-ordinary business information, as did the authors of the First Restatement and many courts before them, is an effective means of mitigating the significant social cost of recognizing property interests in information--the potential for the obstruction of fair competition through information hoarding.
Until the promulgation of the UTSA in the early 1970s and its eventual adoption in most states, 61 the First Restatement was the sole authority to which *199 most courts looked to define the scope of trade secret protection and the elements of the cause of action for wrongful disclosure. 62 Whereas the First Restatement incorporates substantive limits on protected subject matter--limits that are conceptually distinct from factual considerations concerning the competitive value and relative secrecy of the information sought to be protected--the UTSA does not. Under the UTSA, trade secret "means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process" that derives independent economic value from not being generally known and that is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. 63 "There is," as one court has said, "virtually no category of information that cannot, as long as the information is protected from disclosure to the public, constitute a trade secret" within the meaning of the UTSA. 64 It is to this more open definition of trade secrets, not limited by the First Restatement's requirements of continuous use and non-ephemerality, that proponents of secret prices appeal. And while it is convenient for them that the UTSA does not incorporate the Restatement's requirement of continuous use, the story of how the UTSA came not to include the requirement has nothing to do with sales price information, nor does it reflect any intention on the part of the uniform statute's drafters to expand the common law definition of trade secrets to include ephemeral information like sales prices.
That the UTSA can be read to embrace transaction-specific price information is, in actuality, an unintended consequence of the drafters' decision to dispense with present continuous use as a necessary condition for trade secrecy. 65 The Commissioners explained their departure from § 757's requirement of continuous use only in narrow terms of the reasonableness of opening up the definition of trade secrecy to "extend[] protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to use." 66 The change was also intended, according to the Commissioners, to bring within the scope of protection "information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, for example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will *200 not work." 67 Neither of these purposes--protecting useful information not yet being used and useless information whose ultimate lack of value was expensive to discover--embraces transaction-specific sales price information. In removing the requirement of continuous use, the UTSA's drafters intended to bring within the scope of trade secrecy a very limited category of information that was not previously covered: information that has, or appeared at one time to have, the potential for continuous use in the operation of the business. 68 In light of the Commissioners' Comments, it is clear that the elimination of the continuous use requirement was not intended to bring ephemeral information within the scope of trade secrecy or to provide legal cover for efforts by sellers to gain the upper hand in price negotiations by cloaking quotidian sales prices in the mantle of trade secrecy. The UTSA's drafting history has fallen by the wayside, however, as individual states have enacted their own versions of the uniform statute. Colorado courts, for example, have interpreted the omission to allow trade secret protection under the Colorado UTSA for a bid on a contract 69 --a type of information specifically identified in the First Restatement as falling outside the limits of protection. 70 Adopting a plain meaning interpretation of the Colorado UTSA, the court rejected a defendant's argument, presumably premised on the Restatement, that a bid could not be a trade secret as a matter of law because it was not continuously used in the plaintiff's business. 71 The court declined to "read a continuous use requirement into this statute when it does not contain such language nor any legislative intent to include this concept." 72 Tennessee, for its part, has modified the UTSA's definition of trade secret to expressly include "financial data" within its scope. 73 This category may well encompass sales prices, although the question has not yet been decided by any Tennessee court. Although the drafters of the UTSA did not mean to bring ephemeral business information within the scope of trade secrecy when they eliminated the requirement of continuous use from the statutory definition, such has been the unintended consequence of the modification, at least in some jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA.
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Even after the adoption of the UTSA in most states, however, the First Restatement's definition has continued to be cited and relied on by courts tasked with delimiting the scope of trade secret protection. 74 The persistence of the definition from § 757 is remarkable considering the near-antiquity of the First Restatement, the statutory pre-emption (in most states) of any common law cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, 75 and the ostensibly superseding treatment of trade secret doctrine in the more recent (but seldom cited) Third Restatement of Unfair Competition. 76 The continuing vitality of § 757 suggests that the UTSA has defined the scope of trade secrecy so amorphously that it has not provided courts with an adequate analytical framework for deciding what is or is not a trade secret. Seeking clearer parameters than the laconic statute provides, courts have fallen back on the detailed guidance in § 757. This interpretive *202 pathway through the UTSA by means of the First Restatement is not inconsistent with the stated purpose of the UTSA's drafters to codify, not redefine, the existing common law of trade secrets. 77 As an example, one federal court deciding a claim under the Pennsylvania Trade Secrets Act (PTSA) recently elected simply to stand on the definition from § 757. 78 Explaining the choice, the court said that "there is no indication that the statute effected a substantive shift in the definition of 'trade secret"'--a conclusion "supported by post-PTSA cases that rely on common law in determining whether certain information rises to the level of a trade secret." 79 The First Restatement does not preclude the possibility that information relating to the sale of goods can be a trade secret, but the example of trade secret sales-related information offered in § 757--"a code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue" 80 --satisfies the complementary criteria of non-ephemerality and continuous use. Although transaction-specific sales information in the form of the price paid for a product could result from the application of a trade secret discount or rebate code, under the logic of § 757 such information cannot be considered a trade secret in its own right, because it relates to a single, ephemeral commercial event. Applying this principle to Guidant's claims of price secrecy, the claim in Aspen for protection of Guidant's strategic pricing process is supported by § 757, whereas the claim in ECRI for protection of actual prices paid is not. Actual prices paid fall under the rubric of "ordinary business information" that does not warrant trade secret protection. The First Restatement's differentiation of protected, price-generative information from unprotected, price-paid information is captured in linguistically varied terms used by a wide range of courts that have afforded protection to durable price-related information, such as a pricing "architecture,"
81 "model," 82 "strategy," 83 "formula," 84 or "mechanism." 85 The distinction has been elided, however, by vague references in other decisions, often in dicta, to the protected status of "pricing information," 86 "pricing data," 87 or "price data and figures." 88 Each of these vaguely defined categories could encompass prices paid.
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By distinguishing between trade secret information and confidential business information of a non-trade secret nature, the First Restatement describes a doctrinal framework that expressly excludes ordinary, ephemeral business information from the scope of trade secrecy. 89 This fact was recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Clark v. Bunker, in which the court singled out ephemeral information as the only category of information excluded from trade secret protection because of its "inherent qualities." 90 In several other post-Restatement common law cases, the requirement of continuous use has similarly been invoked to exclude ephemeral information from the otherwise roomy embrace of trade secrecy. 91 In Cal Francisco Investment Corp. v. Vrionis, the court acknowledged that "[a]lthough the nature of a trade secret is somewhat nebulous, a characteristic common to those secrets which have found protection from disclosure and use by the courts is the need for their continued use." 92 The court concluded that individual real estate listings were ephemeral in nature and unnecessary for the continued operation of the plaintiff-broker's business: "[A]s in the sale of products [,] each sale of real estate is a distinct transaction." 93 In Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., the process by which the plaintiff zeroed in on a particular corporate takeover target was held to be a trade secret, because "[i]nformation like this would be used in running the business," but the identity of a specific target at a particular time was held not to be protected. 94 A comparable result was reached in Bear, Stearns Funding, Inc. v. Interface Group-Nevada Inc., 95 in which the financial information of a corporate borrower whose loan was being offered for securitization was held not to be a trade *204 secret because it "relate[ed] only to an ephemeral (in this case, nonrecurring) event in the conduct of [the company's] business." 96 In the commercial sales context, courts deciding common law trade secrets claims, most of which involved the enforcement of non-competes, 97 have declined to extend trade secret protection to price information--understood broadly as both compilations of wholesale prices and prices charged to individual customers--on the ground that, even if adequate efforts were undertaken to maintain the secrecy of such information, prices fluctuate over time in any industry and are therefore not the type of information eligible for trade secret protection. 98 In keeping with this logic, an employer's stale price proposals have been held not to be protected from disclosure by a former employee, even though the methods for arriving at the proposals are protected. 99 A few courts in UTSA jurisdictions have echoed this reasoning, 100 despite the fact that the UTSA, unlike the First Restatement, does not expressly exclude *205 ephemeral information from the scope of trade secrecy. For example, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has held that pricing information for a printing company's largest customer was not a trade secret because such information was "subject to change" and "subject to the market." 101 Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected an employer's claim of trade secrecy for projected sales and costs because such information became obsolete once actual sales figures were obtained. 102 The Ohio court pointed out that by the time of the injunction hearing in the case, the purported trade secret sales information was already outdated. 103 Although neither court made reference to the Restatement's per se exclusion of ephemeral information, both applied the Restatement factors in reaching their decisions, and both rested their decisions on the non-durability of the price information at issue.
Another reason why courts, applying both the common law and the UTSA, have held that prices for goods are not eligible for trade secret protection is that prices are necessarily disclosed to every paying customer and are therefore manifestly readily ascertainable (i.e., not secret). 105 Courts in Illinois, following the lead of those in Pennsylvania, recognize that although "a unique formula used to calculate the price information which is not disclosed to a business's customers" can be a trade secret, "price information which is disclosed by a business to any of its customers" cannot. 106 Although these courts do not take the position that prices *206 are precluded from being regarded as trade secrets because of their intrinsic ephemerality, they do treat the disclosure of a price to a customer in the course of a sales transaction as an essentially public disclosure that is fundamentally inimical to secrecy. This is true in part because such disclosures often do not end with the customer; once disclosed to the customer by the seller, the price is likely to be disclosed again by the customer to the seller's competitor as the customer seeks to negotiate the most favorable deal he or she can for the goods he or she wants. 107 This series of disclosures is what enables price competition and efficient, informed determinations of market price.
A feature apparently common to the cases involving the destruction of secrecy through the disclosure of prices to customers, however, is the absence of any express promise of confidentiality between the seller and the buyer that would prohibit the buyer from disclosing prices. 108 Such promises, increasingly common in contracts between medical device manufacturers and hospitals, were at the center of Guidant's claims for trade secret device prices. 109 Binding a buyer to confidentiality does nothing to change the ephemeral nature of a sales price, and therefore nothing to overcome the per se exclusion of ephemeral information from *207 trade secrecy under § 757; however, if that exclusion is held to have fallen away along with the UTSA's omission of the requirement of present continuous use, the existence of a confidentiality agreement between buyer and seller becomes probative--potentially highly so--of the trade secret status of a price. Indeed, a Wisconsin court has held, misconstruing authorities from Illinois and Pennsylvania that distinguish quite clearly between protected price-generative information and unprotected price-paid information, that the existence of a confidentiality agreement between a seller and its customers is a "special circumstance" that can bring actual prices charged for goods sold within the protection of the UTSA. 110 Absent the related requirements of continuous use and non-ephemerality, there is no doctrinal bar to including prices paid within the scope of trade secret protection, and the question of whether any particular price can be considered a trade secret is transformed from a question of law to be answered (in the negative) by the court into one of fact to be answered (unpredictably) by a jury. The nature of the information is no longer dispositive; only its confidential treatment and competitive value--both intensely fact-sensitive--matter. For proponents of trade secret sales prices, who have a strong interest in controlling price information in the hands of customers to prevent price competition, legal claims that seek to leverage the unintended consequences of the UTSA's revision of the First Restatement could be regarded as a prudent investment in the prevention of price erosion.
It is neither legally nor logically necessary, however, for courts in UTSA jurisdictions to treat as a fait accompli the accidental evolution that has made trade secret claims for transaction-specific sales prices--excluded per se from the scope of common law trade secrecy--seem plausible. In deciding cases like Guidant's, courts may consider not only the fact that the requirement of continuous use does not appear in the UTSA, but the reason why it does not appear there. Bearing in mind that the express intention of the UTSA's drafters was merely to "codif[y] the basic principles of common law trade secret protection" and not to dramatically expand the scope of trade secrecy, 111 the definition of trade secret under the UTSA should be interpreted as coextensive with that under § 757, except to the very *208 limited extent that the UTSA's drafters sought to modify the requirements of § 757. 112 To read the UTSA's omission of the requirement of present continuous use as synonymous with an embrace of all forms and types of ephemeral business information is to read the statute as repealing, rather than relaxing, an essential element of the common law definition of trade secrets. Such a reading not only undermines the drafters' express intent, it transforms a legal regime grounded in the prevention of unfair competition between businesses into one that can be called upon to manipulate the balance of power between businesses and their customers in the marketplace for goods. The admitted reason for which device manufacturers are seeking trade secrecy for prices paid--to maintain bargaining leverage in relationships with customers--is completely foreign to the policy goals underlying trade secrecy: encouraging innovation and promoting ethical business conduct between competitors.
IV. The Device Market, the Escalating Cost of Health Care, and the Push for Price Transparency
Extending trade secret protection to prices paid for medical devices is unsound not only as a matter of intellectual property policy but also as a matter of health care policy. Understanding why requires some explanation of both the current state of health care spending in the United States and the economic context in which device manufacturers have historically operated. I begin with some statistics: Health care costs in the United States were $2.3 trillion in 2007--16 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). 113 They increased at two times the rate of inflation and are projected to consume 20 percent of GDP by 2016. 114 Since 2000, health insurance premiums for those insured through employment-based plans have increased 100 percent, measured against cumulative inflation of 24 percent and cumulative wage growth of 21 percent during the same period. 115 Implantable medical devices, including those dedicated to heart rhythm management, account for a significant share of our now prodigious annual national *209 health care expenditure. 116 For example, in 2003 alone approximately 125,000 defibrillators were implanted in patients in the United States at a total cost of some $5 billion. 117 In comparative terms, this number of implants corresponds to a rate per million patients that is 26 times that of Japan and 14 times that of France. 118 Indeed, the volume of interventional cardiology procedures in the United States far outstrips that of Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in every category from pacemakers and defibrillators to coronary stents. 119 The rise in these costly procedures is contributing to dramatic annual increases in the cost of health care. One study conducted in 2002 found that drugs and medical devices together accounted for 22% of healthcare insurance premium increases in the U.S. from 2001 to 2002. 120 Today's very advanced and very expensive technology of heart rhythm management is the result of decades of investment, invention, and innovation by a small handful of manufacturers collaborating with researchers and cardiologists. 121 The pacemaker, which was introduced in 1952 as an external appliance the size of a toaster oven, has been transformed through the incorporation of microprocessors into a tiny implant about the size of a quarter that packs the processing power of a mainframe computer. 122 Both smaller and smarter than their predecessors, the newest generation of pacemakers and defibrillators is controlled by tiny computers that can sense and respond automatically to changes in heart rhythms. 123 The rapid pace of innovation in CRM technology and the ever-increasing sophistication of devices have come with a high price tag. The average price of a pacemaker, the least expensive class of devices, is about $5,000. 124 Conventional implantable defibrillators cost $22,000 on average. 125 At the high end of the scale, CRT-Ds, the defibrillator-like devices used to treat congestive heart failure, are priced between $30,000 and $35,000 apiece. 126 These prices reflect only the cost *210 of the devices themselves and do not include the costs associated with implanting them, such as paying doctors and other hospital staff, booking procedure rooms, and paying for post-procedure care and monitoring.
Given the high price of devices and the increasing number of implants, it should come as no surprise that the business of cardiac rhythm management has been booming. Revenues in the United States for device manufacturers in 2003 were $3.1 billion for pacemakers, $2.5 billion for defibrillators, and $1.6 billion for CRT-Ds. 127 And while it is true, as corporations are wont to say in their investment prospectuses, that past performance is no guarantee of future profits, device manufacturers and those who invest in them have a number of reasons to remain bullish. 128 Among these reasons are an aging population, the continued prevalence of heart and coronary artery disease, and the fact that modern medical practice in the United States has an almost limitless capacity to assimilate new technologies. 129 One of the main reasons that CRM device manufacturers have fared so well economically is that price competition in the market for implantable medical devices has historically been virtually non-existent. 130 This is because medical devices belong to a category of specialty goods known as physician preference items (PPIs). 131 PPIs alone can account for as much as 60 percent of a hospital's annual supply expenditure. 132 Statistics from one New York health system revealed that although PPIs constituted only 3 percent of supply purchases, they consumed 40 percent of the system's total supply spending and had increased in price annually by 8 to 15 percent during the period covered by the study. 133 PPIs are, as their name indicates, chosen by physicians who receive specialized training from device manufacturers and who tend, as a result of this training and intense cultivation by sales representatives, to be loyal to a particular manufacturer to the exclusion of others. 134 When a device manufacturer's sales *211 representatives pitch new devices to an implanting physician, they sell on technology and features, not on price. 135 The traditional purchasing model has been for the physician to choose the device, heedless of cost, and for the hospital to pay for it, also heedless of cost. 136 With price considerations altogether removed from the equation, the physician tends to choose the latest offering from his or her preferred manufacturer, regardless of the potential availability of less costly alternatives. 137 It is not difficult to see how this model, which altogether divorces the hospital's cost considerations from the physician's choice, has operated to keep device prices high. 138 The traditional PPI purchasing model has been under threat in recent years, however, as hospital administrators have attempted to control rising implant costs by seeking to align the choices of their physicians with institutional efforts to manage inventories more efficiently and to negotiate vendor contracts more aggressively. 139 The Medical Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), created to advise Congress on issues impacting Medicare, has recommended that hospitals work collaboratively with their physicians to standardize their use of medical devices and to press for larger discounts from device manufacturers. 140 This advice was doubtless prompted in part by a 40 percent increase (from $10 to $14 billion) between 2003 and 2005 in Medicare's total payment to hospitals for implant procedures.
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*212 Alternative purchasing models are thus increasingly being explored and adopted by hospitals across the country to replace the traditional competitive bidding process. 142 In the traditional bidding process, one or two "preferred" vendors, to the exclusion of their competitors, are given substantial market share guarantees--sometimes as much as 90 percent for a single device type--in exchange for price discounts over the course of a fixed contract term. 143 The greater the market share promised, in general, the greater the discount or rebate on price. 144 This preferred vendor model, in which one or two of the three major CRM device manufacturers are effectively locked out during the contract period, is being supplanted by "price-to-play" arrangements. 145 In the price-to-play model, the hospital sets a "shelf price" (i.e., a price ceiling) for a particular device and challenges all manufacturers to meet or beat that price as a precondition for doing business at the hospital. 146 Volume commitments to particular vendors are eschewed, and the shelf price is determined by a hospital committee comprised of administrators and physicians based on a weighted average of the hospital's device costs for the preceding year and "benchmarking to assess best prices achieved at other like institutions." 147 The practice of benchmarking, which Guidant contentiously characterized in its counterclaim against ECRI as "trafficking . . . confidential CRM pricing," 148 functions to increase price transparency in the device market by increasing the amount of price information available to hospital buyers. Increased price *213 transparency in the market for medical services was a core component of the George W. Bush administration's push for consumer-directed health care, a model designed to increase the price sensitivity of patients through high-deductible health plans that shift responsibility for payment from insurers to patients, thus giving patients both a need to know and a reason to care ex ante how much the medical services they receive actually cost. 149 A report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepared for members of Congress in 2007 offered the following explanation of the role of transparent prices in the operation of an efficient market:
Transparent prices play a key role in the efficient allocation of goods and services. . . . Financial economics researchers typically define markets as efficient when prices reflect all available information and when prices adjust swiftly as new information arrives. If buyers and sellers do not know what prices are, then some mutually agreeable trades will fail to occur, thus creating inefficiencies. If buyers can see and compare prices for the same good offered by different sellers, the buyers then save money by choosing the cheapest vendor. If goods are similar but not identical, buyers then can compare prices and qualities offered by different sellers and pick whichever offer suits them best. The buyers' ability to choose an offer that suits them best puts tremendous pressure on all sellers to lower prices, improve quality, or both. Without such competitive pressure firms that are less efficient or that are earning excess profits can remain in the market, and prices will be higher than they would otherwise be. 150 Price transparency also facilitates what economists call "yardstick competition," a way for buyers to compare not only the different prices offered to them by competing sellers for the same or similar products, but the different prices offered to other buyers for those products. 151 Yardstick competition is both the type of competition that device manufacturers like Guidant are seeking to prevent through trade secret pricing and the type of competition that materials managers, the hospital administrators in charge of procurement, are seeking to enhance through benchmarking.
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When discussing the effects of increased price transparency in the market for medical devices, it is important to acknowledge and reckon with the significant ways in which the health care market as a whole differs from, and therefore may behave unlike, markets for standardized commodities. 152 Several aspects of health markets, including natural differentials in the product due to differences in quality and patient characteristics and the widespread practice of price discrimination, limit the effects of price transparency. In addition, other important characteristics interfere with price signals and competitive pricing outcomes: the product is complicated, physicians rather than consumers tend to determine the product purchased, patients generally do not directly pick hospitals, many costs are covered by third parties, and patients have poor information about costs. 153 As a result of these distinctive characteristics, "prices as signals are diluted and muted in the health care market as compared to many other markets," a phenomenon which suggests that "improvements in price transparency may be less effective in the health care market than in other markets." 154 Improvements in price transparency also create the potential for collusion in oligopolistic markets like the device market, to the extent that more transparent prices make cartels easier to enforce. 155 Collusion is far from a foregone conclusion, however, because the harm to competition caused by giving competitors better price information must be weighed against the enhancement to competition caused by putting the same information into the hands of buyers. 156 Notwithstanding the complicated nature of the market for health care, most empirical research on price transparency in other markets suggests that better price information leads in the aggregate to lower, more uniform prices. 157 Not all buyers, of course, stand to benefit from a trend toward more uniform prices in a market characterized, as the device market is, by price discrimination. Buyers for whom uniform prices are lower than the prices they pay under a regime of price discrimination stand to benefit, whereas buyers for whom uniform prices are higher stand to lose. 158 From a policy perspective, though, it is the aggregate, market-wide effect of increased price transparency rather than the effect on individual hospital buyers that is meaningful. As for the effect on individual hospitals, many materials managers feel quite strongly that the information deficit created by trade secrecy for device prices would undermine their efforts, encouraged by MedPAC and *215 necessitated by already narrow margins on implant procedures, to contain rising device costs. 159 Given that price benchmarking is increasingly being used by hospitals as a tool for cost management and a mechanism for shifting leverage in contract negotiations, it should not be surprising that Guidant has moved to include and enforce strict confidentiality provisions in its device contracts. Nor should it be surprising that Guidant has mobilized its lawyers to find a means by which it might effectively stop third parties like Aspen and ECRI from using or disseminating price information obtained when hospitals, acting out of self-interest, elect to breach their promises of confidentiality. What hospital buyers stand to discover through benchmarking, and what device manufacturers would rather they not know, is not so much that price discrimination exists in the market for medical devices. That's not news. The news is that the gap between the prices two hospitals pay for the same device can amount to a chasm.
A recent survey of a hundred hospitals revealed that prices to different hospitals for the same orthopedic device ranged from $2,000 to $9,000--a striking differential by any measure. 160 Such price differentials are not always explained, as one might suspect they would be, by differences in purchase volume or hospital size. A ten-hospital health system based in Illinois discovered as the result of an internal survey that the hospitals in the system with the highest procedure volume were actually those paying the highest prices for PPIs. 161 By intervening legally to limit the flow of price information to hospital purchasing agents, who are experimenting with new sources of leverage and ways to bargain, Guidant has made an indirect play to quash the emerging redistribution of power in the PPI contracting process. The economic motivation for Guidant's legal campaign to propertize and thereby control information about the prices hospitals pay for devices is not difficult to discern. Health care economists and other industry watchers have predicted that the enormous financial success of device manufacturers over the last two decades will be unsustainable in the long run, leading device manufacturers to seek new ways to maintain their profits. 162 Health care economist Lawton R. Burns attributes the delayed development of price pressure in the device market to the fact that "the cost of devices is often *216 submerged in payments to hospitals." 163 Burns warns that "[m]anufacturers should expect greater payer scrutiny of the prices for their products . . . as the technologies diffuse to the wider population and as reports surface about their actual cost." 164 Science historian Kirk Jeffrey sounds a similar note: "Eventually the pacemaker, once a glamour product, will become a commodity: all brands will offer essentially identical features, all secrets of design and production will stand revealed. Prices will plummet. Of course, the manufacturers strive to postpone that day, and thus far they have succeeded handily." 165 The latest phase in "succeeding handily" has been resistance to the trend toward commodity pricing through the assertion of legal claims for trade secret prices--a way to keep the actual price of devices, and the sometimes profound extent to which those prices can vary from one buyer to the next, obscure. In pressing the cases against Aspen and ECRI, Guidant may be acting as the de facto standard bearer for the device industry as a whole. 166 With both suits privately settled and the legal status under the UTSA of actual prices paid for devices publicly unsettled, Guidant and its competitors may now be benefiting from a litigation-induced chilling effect on both formal and informal benchmarking practices. To the extent that this is true, the industry may be winning the war against price disclosure, even though Guidant did not score decisive wins in either of its court battles.
The publicity generated by the Guidant litigation may ultimately prove, however, to be a double-edged sword for manufacturers. Given the level of scrutiny the trade press has trained on the Aspen and ECRI cases, hospital administrators are now on notice of a fundamental tension between the alternative purchasing models they have embraced, which rely on yardstick competition, and the broad promises of confidentiality that they and their peers have been making in their contracts with device manufacturers. 167 The author of a recent article in the trade magazine Materials Management in Healthcare offered the following advice to readers: "To counteract this trend [toward price secrecy], materials managers *217 will have to work together. Sources agree that they should continue to push back by obtaining legal department backing to overturn confidentiality clauses." 168 While it is unclear on what legal grounds confidentiality provisions in existing device contracts could be overturned, such provisions are open to renegotiation when the contracts in which they appear expire, and some hospital executives have openly committed to taking a harder line with respect to manufacturers' demands for confidentiality. 169 If hospital buyers in large numbers successfully resist confidentiality demands during contract negotiations, the factual basis for manufacturers' claims that device prices are trade secrets will erode. Secrecy-in-fact is, after all, the sine qua non of any viable trade secret claim, under both the common law and the UTSA. And if the economic predictions of industry watchers are correct, the price pressure that device manufacturers have so far been successful in avoiding will finally be brought to bear as hospitals rely increasingly on benchmarking to learn what other buyers in the marketplace are actually paying. The existence of extremely divergent prices for the same device is a sign that consumers in the *218 device market are poorly informed. 170 It is hard to imagine that any hospital administrator would agree to pay $9000 for a device that he or she knows another hospital is getting for $2000. While there is some risk that the lower profits caused by downward price pressure will lead to decreased incentives for manufacturers to invest in further research and development, 171 the greater social risk may be that the national health care system will soon collapse under the weight of uncontrollably rising costs. 172 A second effect of the publicity surrounding the Guidant litigation was the introduction in the U.S. Senate of the Transparency in Medical Device Pricing Act of 2007 (TMDPA), a proposed amendment to the Social Security Act. 173 The bill, which is co-sponsored by Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, requires device manufacturers, as a condition of receiving payment from Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP, to submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, for publication on the website of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, quarterly data on average and median sales prices for all implantable medical devices. 174 In their floor statements, Senators Specter and Grassley presented the TMDPA as a legislative solution to the problem of price secrecy and a policy intervention on behalf of hospitals and patients. 175 Senator Grassley asserted that passage of the bill "would go a long way *219 toward ensuring that free market forces actually work" in the device market--a market in which "hospitals are at the mercy of medical device makers who have the upper hand." 176 In reality, the bill in its current form falls far short of the goal of bringing true price transparency to the market for medical devices. If it is enacted, it will require manufacturers to give less detailed price information to the government than subscriber hospitals were submitting to ECRI's online database at the time the Guidant litigation was initiated. In its online database, ECRI published low prices in addition to average prices by model for Guidant CRM devices, thereby allowing hospitals to find the floor of the market for any given device by seeing the price paid by the toughest bargainer with the most negotiating power. ECRI also reported prices paid by its subscribers on both a regional and a national basis, 177 thereby allowing hospitals to account for geographical price variations. With access to only national median and average prices, which is all the TMDPA requires, hospitals would be unable to determine either the range of prices charged for a particular device or the low price charged, and they would have no comparative information of any kind with respect to regional prices.
In addition to the fact that its disclosure requirements are strikingly modest, the TMDPA contains a vague exemption, pursuant to which "certain sales may be excluded in the case where the Secretary determines such exclusion is appropriate." 178 The bill is silent as to what types of sales might qualify for exclusion, how such exclusions would be sought by manufacturers, and how determinations would be made at the agency level concerning the appropriateness of the exclusions sought. 179 If the legislation is enacted, to the extent that the median and average device prices published by the government will not, in fact, reflect all sales, the government's information will be less accurate and therefore much less informative than the data that were being compiled and disseminated by service providers like ECRI before the Guidant litigation.
The timidity of the TMDPA may be intended to avoid a challenge by manufacturers that price disclosure requirements constitute a regulatory taking of trade secrets. But even if manufacturers like Guidant could establish the trade secret status under state law of the actual prices hospitals pay for devices, which they have not yet done in any jurisdiction, the Supreme Court's ruling in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 180 strongly suggests that legislation containing more *220 granular price disclosure requirements than those in the TMDPA would survive judicial scrutiny. In Ruckelshaus, the Court rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge by a pesticide manufacturer to amended provisions in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) that require manufacturers seeking government registration of pesticides to disclose to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) health, safety, and environmental data. 181 The statute, in turn, authorizes the EPA to disclose this data to the public under certain circumstances. 182 Specifically, public disclosure is permitted if the Administrator of the EPA determines that it is "necessary in the public's interest," 183 notwithstanding an express provision in the statute barring the disclosure of trade secrets. 184 The Court in Ruckelshaus agreed with the trial court that, to the extent the data at issue were protected under state trade secret law, Monsanto had a cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest in them. 185 The Court disagreed with the trial court, however, that the EPA's public disclosure of the data as permitted by the statute would constitute a taking. 186 It held that "as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking." 187 As the Court saw it, the decision whether the economic value of obtaining registration was greater to Monsanto than the cost of having its data disclosed in the public's interest was Monsanto's to make. 188 Because the government offered something of value to applicants (i.e., registration and the concomitant right to sell in the U.S. market) in return for the potential public disclosure of their proprietary data, there was no uncompensated taking. 189 If Monsanto valued the benefits of secrecy more highly than those of registration, it was free to opt out of the U.S. market and focus on international sales.
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The Court's reasoning in Ruckelshaus seems to apply straightforwardly to legislation requiring a device manufacturer to disclose its allegedly trade secret prices to the government, for subsequent disclosure to the public, in exchange for the right to participate in and receive reimbursement from government-sponsored health programs. Assuming for the sake of argument that the prices paid for devices can be trade secrets, a statute requiring their disclosure would not run afoul of the Fifth Amendment as long as it (1) gives manufacturers notice that the reported data are subject to public disclosure in the interest of promoting the public's interest (e.g., in affordable health care) and (2) offers manufacturers something of value in return for their disclosures (e.g., the advantage of participating in government health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid). A statute offering the benefit of government reimbursement for devices in exchange for public disclosure of the actual prices charged for those devices would present device manufacturers with a legitimate value proposition closely analogous to the one presented to pesticide manufacturers by FIFRA. Therefore, there would be no uncompensated taking.
If the TMDPA were amended to require more comprehensive and informative price disclosures than it currently does, and to eliminate the vague exemption for "certain sales," it would genuinely advance the cause of price transparency in the health care market. In its current form, however, the bill fails even to preserve the informational status quo that existed when ECRI sought a declaratory judgment that it was not misappropriating Guidant's trade secrets by publishing price information submitted to its online database by subscribing hospitals.
V. Conclusion
Confronted with the development of unprecedented price pressure in the market for surgical implants, the Guidant Corporation has taken the lead among device manufacturers in asserting trade secrecy for sales prices. Its admitted motivation for doing so is not to prevent such information from falling into the hands of competitors, which is the traditional concern in trade secrets cases, but to prevent customers from accessing comparative price information that could increase their leverage in contract negotiations. As yet, there has been no determination by any court that the actual prices hospitals pay for CRM devices are trade secrets under the UTSA, but neither has there been any contrary determination. Given the unsettled state of the law in this area and Guidant's demonstrated willingness to sue information providers, price opacity will likely reign in the market for medical devices unless hospitals in significant numbers begin to resist manufacturer demands of price confidentiality in the contracting process. Even if such resistance fails, however, courts presented in the future with "prices paid" trade secret claims under the UTSA--for medical device prices or, for that matter, for any sales prices--have a legitimate doctrinal basis for deciding that such claims are foreclosed a matter of law: Transaction-specific sales price information does not fall within the very narrowly expanded definition of trade *222 secrets that was adopted by the architects of the UTSA when they set out to codify the existing common law.
Although the TMDPA has been offered as a legislative solution to the problem of price opacity in the medical device market, the bill in its current form would do little to increase price transparency, because it requires manufacturers to disclose only median and average national sales prices for each device. A more aggressively drafted bill that conditions governmental reimbursement for implants on the manufacturer's disclosure to HHS, for subsequent disclosure to the public, of the full range of prices charged to hospitals would go much further than the TMDPA to promote real price transparency. Such legislation, if challenged by device manufacturers as an unconstitutional taking, would likely survive scrutiny in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ruckelshaus.
While it is true that economists disagree about the probable effects of increased price transparency in the very complex market for health care, there is good evidence to suggest that putting accurate, comprehensible information about quality and price into the hands of consumers--be they hospitals or patients--is a necessary step toward improving the overall efficiency of the health care system. Considered from this perspective, trade secret prices are no more justifiable as a matter of health policy than they are as a matter of intellectual property policy. Expanding patentable and copyrightable subject matter, lengthening the copyright term, giving legal protection to 'digital barbed wire' even if it is used in part to protect against fair use: Each of these can be understood as a vote of no-confidence in the productive powers of the commons."). For an exception to this rule, see generally David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 135 (2007) , which examines the recent and unprecedented intrusion of trade secrecy into aspects of government and public infrastructure, such as voting, where transparency has historically been taken for granted. 6 See Kurt Kruger, The Medical Device Sector, in The Business of Healthcare Innovation 271, 286 (Lawton R. Burns ed., 2005) ("In contrast to the pharmaceutical sector, which is currently under heavy policy pressure over prices, the medical device sector is generally small enough to fly under the radar of political activist groups and policy makers. Expenditures on devices are also buried in the figures for hospital costs, and thus are not easily discerned or tracked."). See, e.g., id. at 18 (stating that "no one really knows how these cases will impact business operations, but there is concern that manufacturers will ... tighten the reins on how much--and with whom--pricing information is shared"); Mantone, supra note 18, at 18 ("The lawsuits are drawing attention from hospital materials managers, who worry the outcomes could restrict hospitals from sharing supply prices with any third party, even affiliated ones."); McGinnity, supra note 18, (discussing the prevalence and value of price benchmarking, and cautioning that secret pricing "could make it more and more difficult for your hospital--and the hospital industry as a whole--to gain control over rising medical device costs"). 23 See Weinstock, supra note 20, at 16 ("The Guidant contract stipulated that third parties were not allowed [to] see any contract information without prior written permission from the manufacturer."); McGinnity, supra note 18, ("These confidentiality clauses vary by vendor but tend to include a range of restrictions, especially regarding the hospital's ability to share contract terms such as pricing."). App. 1922 ) (discussing a secret formula for compounding "cholorine," for "the treatment of diseases of fowls and as a tonic for hogs").
